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Fiduciary-isms: 
A Study of Academic Influence on the Expansion of the Law 
 
We have this kind of wine, not real port, but a tolerably close approximation to 
port, and we call it “port type”. But then someone produces a new kind of wine, 
not port exactly, but also not quite the same as what we now call “port type”. So 
what are we to say? Is it port-type type? It would be tedious to have to say so, 
and besides there would clearly be no future in it.1 
 
I. Introduction 
On arriving in Nashville in August 1989 to clerk for Gilbert Merritt, Jr., then 
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, I was asked to 
read a draft opinion of Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.2 Oral 
argument had been in March. The judge just wanted to bounce his position off his new 
clerks before publication. Twelve years earlier, a handful of movie theaters in Memphis 
had formed a buying group or “split” that would nominate a member to receive exclusive 
rights to show a first-run film without competitive bidding against other theaters, a 
scheme in which the film distributors (who were arms of the producers) acquiesced.3 
Balmoral Cinema, who was outside the split, sued the distributors and theaters, alleging 
that the practice was an anticompetitive boycott in violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.4 Both groups of defendants insisted that the agreement lawfully enhanced rather than 
stifled competition by bypassing distributors’ pricey licensing auctions and sizeable cash 
guarantees, which elevated costs to theaters and moviegoers.5 Likewise did defendants 
                     
1 J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 75 (1962). 
2 Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). 
3 Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 314-15 (6th Cir. 1989). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”). 
5 Balmoral Cinema, 885 F.2d at 316. 
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deny that the split caused Balmoral Cinema’s dire financial circumstances, which owed 
instead to overpaying for rights to exhibit “Voyage of the Damned” while offering 
nothing for “Star Wars” and “Close Encounters of the Third Kind.”6 
 That same summer of 1989 I had taken a course in antitrust law at University of 
Florida from Professor Jeffrey Harrison, a gifted teacher who had written the leading 
books and articles on point. During that course I came to adopt his position as my own: 
the arrangement between the members of the split and the participation by the distributors 
placed an illegal drag on competition. As Professor Harrison later summarized, 
“‘cooperative buying’ may be nothing more than a euphemism for collusive monopsony 
that drives prices below competitive levels and has negative economic effects on social 
welfare similar to those caused by price fixing sellers.”7 To clarify, monopsony is to 
concentrated buying power what monopoly is to concentrated selling power.8  
 When summoned to report back to the judge on Balmoral Cinema – my summer-
school class in antitrust fresh on my mind – I sided with Balmoral Cinema and what I 
saw as the public interest in non-rigged bidding processes for first-run films. Judge 
Merritt listened as I detailed my professor’s arguments on why we should throw the book 
at the split and the distributors for impeding competition by stymying a true auction for 
film exhibition. Excluding Balmoral Cinema from bidding for first-run films, I parroted, 
would profit everyone but movie-goers, to whom the monopsonist-buying group would 
                     
6 Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Tenn. 
1987), aff’d, 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). 
7 ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 
93-94 (1993); see ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 34, 86-87 (2010). 
8 Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 
1565-68 (1989). 
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not pass on its savings in a market with fewer buyers than under competition.9 After all, 
only a monopolist can offer a discount, which, after running off rivals, invariably ends, 
replaced by competition-free price hikes.10 When I finished my recitation, the judge set 
forth the jarring costs of finding a violation of the Sherman Act: millions of dollars 
change hands, businesses shut down, people lose jobs. The judge was unsurprised that my 
arguments had been lifted from a professor, since that’s what professors do: they see it as 
their job to expand the law in their field. It’s not, however, he cautioned, what courts do. 
The Sixth Circuit ruled unanimously in favor of defendants, affirming Judge McRae’s 
decision below.11  
 The full import of this encounter in the judge’s chambers was largely lost on me 
until my employer, California Western School of Law [CWSL], was proposing a merger 
with University of California at San Diego [UCSD]. Throughout the merger discussions 
(2007-2011), CWSL faculty, administrators, and lay board members debated whether, in 
hammering out a workable arrangement with UCSD, legal barriers would arise if CWSL 
faculty turned out to be “fiduciaries” of the school. If faculty were fiduciaries, then it was 
                     
9 Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
297, 303-04 (1991).  
10 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 287 
(2003). 
11 Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Tenn. 
1987), affirmed, 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). Among the various court challenges to splits, there 
was some contrary authority supporting my professor’s position, notably General Cinema Corp. 
v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1982). There, a district court, 
relying on academic lawyers, ruled in favor of the very same film distributor, this time as 
counterclaimant opposing the split, which exhibitors were accused of manipulating to suppress 
the profits of distributors/producers through price-fixing. Gen. Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista 
Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1264 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (citing Robert H. Bork, The Rule of 
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 826 & 
n.162 (1965); James S. Gordon, Horizontal and Vertical Restraints of Trade: The Legality of 
Motion Picture Splits under the Antitrust Laws, 75 YALE L.J. 239, 250 (1966)); see also United 
States v. Capitol Service, Inc., 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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their duty to act for their principals, that is, the parties whose interests fiduciaries must 
put above their own. Accordingly, faculty looking to get a better deal for themselves than 
for the school or other principals would be breaching their fiduciary duty, a tortious act.  
I thought the merger was a bad idea, at least in its proposed iteration. My image of 
the reconstituted post-merger law school had an ominous vibe of layoffs, demotions, and 
an up-in-the-airness that worried me. After twenty years at the same school, I liked things 
well enough the way they were. As a husband and father of three, I resisted anything that 
might be, well, bad for me personally. But if I really was a fiduciary, then maybe what I 
wanted was beside the point. At the same time, if I really was a fiduciary, then who was 
my principal? The school? Who is that? Is it the administration? Current students? 
Alumni? Employees? The community? No answers from the merger’s proponents were 
forthcoming. 
 Fiduciaries are said to operate outside the capitalist free-for-all of exchange 
relations,12 where the freedom of contract is backed up by the power of contract, which 
provides judicially coerced remedies for breach.13 Breaching fiduciaries cough up not just 
the market and consequential damages inflicted on victims, but all gains and savings, 
                     
12 Fiduciary relations are not necessarily contractual. Trustees’ relations with trust beneficiaries, 
for instance, are not contractual, nor can corporate shareholders negotiate the corporate charter, 
by-laws, or managers’ employment terms. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An 
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (1988) (partners’ acts in dissolution 
may violate fiduciary duties even if permitted by partnership agreement); Tamar Frankel, 
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 813 (1983) (citing AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
§ 106 (3d ed. 1967)).  
13 See Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 495 
(1962): 
Power of contract is one of the two sides of freedom of contract. On one hand, freedom 
of contract is a freedom from restraint, an immunity from legal reprisal for making or 
receiving promises. On the other hand, it is not really a freedom of contract, but a 
power of contract, a power to secure legal sanctions when another breaks his promise. 
Cf. Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. 
REV. 763, 777 (1998) (contracts both create and restrain power).  
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even those exceeding the rental rate the parties would have reached in a voluntary 
exchange.14 Nor can an insolvent fiduciary’s creditors reach the property, which is said to 
have been held all along, however fictively, for the victim-principal, never becoming part 
of the estate of the fiduciary.15  
Fiduciaries operate in Platonic relations within which the weak or naïve party 
(dubbed “principal” or “beneficiary”) is subordinate to the strong or knowing party, who 
inverts the relation by subordinating him- or herself to the weak party. The strong-party 
fiduciary takes responsibility for the power/knowledge disparity by, in effect, negating its 
effects by putting the weak party’s interests first. 
Identifying fiduciary relationships is done by analogy to the law of trusts.16 The 
more a candidate for fiduciary status resembles a trustee, the more likely he or she will be 
treated like one. The purpose of the analogy is to smooth out conflicts of interest between 
wealth managers and their clients. Yet this venerable process of arguing by analogy, an 
essential lawyerly shtick, has allowed for a peculiar extension of fiduciary law.17 The 
                     
14 E.g., Am. Master Lease v. Idanta Partners, Ltd., 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 572-77 (Cal. App. 2014). 
15 E.g., In re Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 227 B.R. 244, 253-55 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Robert W. 
Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 889, 896 (1994). 
16 E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 891 (1998) (“The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more 
powerfully than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation.”); Calvin 
Massey, American Fiduciary Duty in an Age of Narcissism, 54 SASK. L. REV. 101 (1990); Eileen 
A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary 
Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (1993); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962). 
17 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983):  
[C]ourts are inconsistent in choosing their analogies. One decision, for example, held 
that directors are trustees, and applied trust rules against self-dealing to them. But, in 
order to avoid applying trust law's strict liability for unauthorized unintentional acts to 
the directors, the court then proceeded to hold that those directors were not trustees. 
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cause? Another essential lawyerly shtick: the sort of pressure Judge Merritt alluded to 
above that is placed on law by academic lawyers.  
After Part II of this Article sets out the structure of trusts, Part III tests whether 
the trust analogy makes non-misleading sense within the laws of partnerships, 
corporations, and agency. Specifically, Part IV demonstrates how academic writing, 
deploying a sense of “fiduciary” so open as to be empty, has influenced courts to 
designate franchisors, insurers, and professors as fiduciaries. After Part V posits how this 
influence has brought about an idiomatic, no-longer technical sense of this essential term 
of art, I conclude that professors’ penchant for pressuring law to change is an activity of 
uncertain value.  
II. Fiduciaries in Trust Relations  
The idea of the fiduciary owes to the law of trusts.18  A trust, in turn, like its 
historical antecedent – the “use”19 – is a gift.20 While ordinary gifts are two-party 
transfers of real or personal property from donor to donee, trusts involve three parties: the 
donor (settlor) arranges with the trustee to divide title to the donated property (trust res) 
between trustee and beneficiary.21 In trust relations, “fiduciary” describes the trustee, 
whose divided interest received from the settlor is “legal” title to the res, which the settlor 
                     
18 In re West of England and South Wales District Bank, ex. P. Dale & Co., 11 Ch.D. 772, 778 
(1879): 
What is a fiduciary relationship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same 
remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a 
trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust. 
19 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); 4 WILLIAM 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 407–79 (3d ed. 1945).  
20 At least trusts were until trustees began accepting compensation for operating between settlor 
and beneficiary. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625, 639 (1995). 
21 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632 
(1995). 
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directs the trustee-fiduciary to manage for the enjoyment of the settlor’s beneficiary.22 
The beneficiary’s divided interest received from the settlor is “equitable” title to the trust 
property, which, according to the trust’s terms, will eventually reunite the divided legal 
and equitable title interests to the beneficiary’s sole advantage.23  
The trust developed at the end of the Middle Ages, when real estate was the 
principal form of wealth. The primary purpose of the trust was to facilitate the transfer of 
freehold land within the family.24 The trust allowed landowners “‘to make decent 
provision for their wives, daughters and younger sons and to prevent escheat’” while 
avoiding other vestiges of bizarre feudal restrictions.25 Trustees early on were mere 
stakeholders with no serious powers or responsibilities of management. Commonly, the 
beneficiaries lived on and managed the land.26 
In an era (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries) when property was less alienable 
than now, the trust, apart from facilitating conveyances within families, was a way to get 
around the ban on unmarried adults, clerics, Christians, foreigners, criminals, and slaves 
owning property.27 Trusts let property owners arrange for the enjoyment of property by 
these banned classes by passing legal title to a trustee who held for the equitable owner, a 
member of the banned class.  
                     
22 In re Estate of Giraldin, 55 Cal. 4th 1058, 1065-68 (2012). 
23 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 553 (4th ed. 2012). 
24 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632 
(1995).  
25 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 633 
(1995) (quoting WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, Trust, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW § 9, at 12 (1973)). 
26 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 633 
(1995). 
27 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE 
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 231, 237-38 (2d ed. 1898). 
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Trusts eventually became an effective way to manage a portfolio of financial 
assets,28 guard against waste of property by an immature or irresponsible family member, 
or avoid taxes on the settlor’s estate.29 Because trustees are exposed to temptation to use 
trust assets for personal benefit, they may collect fees for their services in amounts 
authorized by the trust or by court approval, but may not otherwise profit from the trust.30 
Consequently, any profits diverted by the trustee are disgorged and conveyed to the 
beneficiary in restitution as the remedy for the trustee’s unjust enrichment.31 Not 
surprisingly in this Platonic relation of inverted power, both the trustee’s resignation32 
and removal33 are far from automatic. 
III. Fiduciaries in Trust-Like Relations 
Fiduciary law expanded from the trust, to partnerships, to joint stock companies 
and corporations, to agents and factors.34 Much of the pioneering work in the 
development of the scope of the word “fiduciary” was done not by courts, but by treatise 
                     
28 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 
(1995). 
29 See, e.g., Richard W. Nenno, Planning To Minimize or Avoid State Income Tax on Trusts, 34 
AM. COLL. OF TR. AND EST. COUNSEL 131, 143-44 (2008). 
30 See, e.g., 4C MISSOURI PRAC. TRUST CODE & LAW MANUAL § 456.7-708 (2015-16 ed.). 
31 In re Beatty’s Estate, 214 Pa. 449 (1906). 
32 TEX. PROPERTY CODE ANN. § 113.081 (West 1984). 
33 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 806 (1983) (“Under trust law, a 
beneficiary cannot remove the trustee without proving in court that the trustee is incapacitated or 
has a substantial conflict of interest.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trusts Law, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 664 (2004) (Law “does not necessarily permit removal for breaches 
that are not ‘serious’ or for simple disagreements. Trustees who were chosen by the settlor, as 
compared to those named by a third party or a court, are even less readily removed; there is ... a 
thumb on the scale for them.”). 
34 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983). 
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writers of the Romantic era: Jeremy (1828), Lewin (1837), Maddock (1837), and Story 
(1839).35 The pioneering continues.36 
A. Partnerships 
The principle that middle-men/trustees must tend others’ interests, not their own, 
has been converted into a more generalized constraint on professionals’ permissible range 
of wealth-maximizing endeavors. For example, partnerships, which emerged in the 
sixteenth century37 (or before),38 have always traded on the criteria or structure of trusts. 
So it is by now hornbook that “[i]n defining fiduciary responsibilities, courts ... borrow 
from the ... standards applied to fiduciaries in other contexts,” even though “standards 
developed to regulate other fiduciaries would not control the conduct expected of 
partners.”39 To be sure, the analogy between trusts and partnerships is strained.  
Partnerships are “association[s] of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit.”40 Within this structure, partners may shield themselves from personal 
liability for debts incurred by the partnership.41 As co-owners, partners may sue each 
other; the partnership, too, as an entity separate from its members, may sue and be sued 
                     
35 L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 72 n.11. 
36 E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 881 (1988) (“The evolution of fiduciary obligation ... owe[s] much to the situation-
specificity and flexibility that were Equity's hallmarks.”); Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 41 
(1982) (This court has, however, specifically refused to define “a fiduciary relationship in precise 
detail and in such a manner as to exclude new situations.”). 
37 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 
1 (rev. perm. ed. 1974). 
38 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 n.3 (1983) (citing JUDSON CRANE & 
ALAN BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 11 (1968)). 
39 Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 459 
(1987). 
40 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 521 (1927) (quoting UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1) (1917)).  
41 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-45 (West 1999). 
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by the partners.42 Eccentric from the standpoint of the grammar of trusts, partners as 
fiduciaries are considered both trustee and beneficiary at once.43 In other words, in 
partnerships, the weak-party beneficiary is also the strong-party trustee in the Platonic 
sense referred to above, thus stretching reed-thin the notion of divided title. “The 
fiduciary as joint owner,” therefore, “is something of a contradiction in terms, since the 
fiduciary lacks the beneficial interest aspect of true ownership. Partners, on the other 
hand, are always joint owners” in both senses,44 all rowing together for the greater good 
of the partnership. There is, in sum, no middle-man manager of partnership assets, a key 
element of (real) trust relations.45 Nor does the function of settlor in a trust have specific 
application to partnerships. 
Although trusts and partnerships share only a vague family resemblance, breaches 
that go to the essence of a partnership agreement are considered betrayals, not just run-of-
the-mill derelictions of a contracting party’s promises.46 At times the partnership-as-trust 
analogy is literalized. For example, in Massachusetts, “partners act as trustees for the 
benefit of each other with respect to the trust res which consists of the partnership 
assets.”47 If there were any doubt about what this means, a federal bankruptcy court has 
clarified both that “Massachusetts partnerships satisfy the necessary elements of an 
                     
42 REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 405 (a)-(b) (2014); cf. State v. Gard, 742 N.W.2d 257, 
262 (S.D. 2007)(“[T]he law in most states today is that a partner can be found guilty of 
embezzlement when he misappropriates funds from his partnership”). 
43 Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1897) (Partnership is “a contract of mutual 
agency, each partner acting as a principal in his own behalf and as agent for his co-partner.”). 
44 Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 458 
(1987). 
45 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 900 
(1997). 
46 Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
47 In re Friedman, 298 B.R. 487, 498 (D. Mass. 2003) (italics omitted). 
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express trust and that partners act in a fiduciary capacity toward each other” for purposes 
of determining whether a breaching fiduciary’s debt to the partnership is dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.48 Massachusetts is not alone.49 
While in normal contractual settings capitalism encourages opportunism, tort law 
expects much more from fiduciaries. Central to the sort of theatricalized lingo that has 
always pervaded fiduciary law is Justice Cardozo’s celebrated downstage declamation in 
Meinhard v. Salmon, cited some 5,000 times since 1928, a highly theatricalized elevation 
of the fiduciary over the base “morals of the market place.”50  
Despite the moralizing,51 a partner, it turns out, “is not the sort of fiduciary who 
must behave as a disinterested trustee”:52 partners can and do pursue self-interest.53 If the 
law saw things otherwise, unprofitable partners would be expected to withdraw for the 
good of the partnership; but they are not.54 Indeed, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
of 1997 [RUPA], now adopted by some two-thirds of the states,55 has codified the 
                     
48 In re Friedman, 298 B.R. 487, 499 (D. Mass. 2003) (reading 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2016). But 
cf. In re Seay, 215 B.R. 780, 786 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1997) (detailing Tenth Circuit split on whether 
partnerships are also trusts for purposes of § 523(a)(4)). 
49 For example, Arizona (DeSantis v. Dixon, 72 Ariz. 345, 236 (1951)), and California (Leff v. 
Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 514 (1983)), follow the Massachusetts position. See generally In re 
Humphries, 516 B.R. 856, 868 n.8 (N.D. Miss. 2014) (detailing circuit-split over nature of co-
partners’ relations for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)(2016)). 
50 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64 (1928). 
51 Compare Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 
456 (1987)(“There is a moral theme to the concept of fiduciary responsibilities”), with Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 438 n.28 
(1993)(“Fiduciary duties ... have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived 
and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”). 
52 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 905 
(1997). 
53 Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 465 
(1987). 
54 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 896 
(1997). 
55 John M. Taylor, Professional Partner Expulsion: The Effects of RUPA and Section 736, 
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judgment that partners cannot realistically be expected to be out only for others.56 
Specifically, section 404(e) of RUPA provides that “[a] partner does not violate ... this act 
or ... a partnership agreement merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s 
interest.”57 While trustees are strictly liable for acting against their beneficiaries’ 
interests, partners’ duties are only to avoid harms to the partnership through gross 
negligence or worse.58 Section 404(e) therefore diverges from what is found in many 
judicial opinions: an injunction against a partner’s pursuit of advantage over the 
partnership.59  
This divergence reflects developments in corporate law, where judicial 
supervision of fiduciaries has backed off from traditional fiduciary-law rhetoric.60 In 
particular, under RUPA, partners may re-bargain their agreement on the fly, lend money 
to the partnership, purchase its assets, or obtain waivers of fiduciary duties for specific 
purposes.61 By codifying the permissible pursuit of self-interest, RUPA acknowledges 
that sweeping statements of fiduciary duties invite costly litigation and threats of 
                                                             
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1, 5 (May/June 2007); Clay B. Wortham, Revised Uniform Partnership Act: 
Anomalies of a Simplified, Modernized Partnership Law, 92 KY. L.J. 1083, 1083 n.4 
(2004)(citing ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 1, at 531-
32 (2003)). 
56 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 905 
(1997). 
57 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1399, 1485-86 (2002). 
58 CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM 
PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 8.404, at 326 & n.124 
(2001) (Wolters-Kluwer 2015).  
59 Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in Partnership, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 268 & n.266 (2004). 
60 See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 
458 (1987).  
61 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 
905-07 (1997). These waivers only go so far. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b) (1997). 
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litigation, including by partners who seek to avoid some aspect of their partnership 
agreement.62 As the reporter for RUPA has summarized: “The partner is no longer a 
trustee.”63 
Push comes to shove, partners see their own function as more Darwinist than the 
mincing agents Justice Cardozo associated with fiduciaries 85 years ago. Indeed, in a suit 
over a Wall Street law firm’s decision to close its West Palm Beach branch and fire all 17 
branch partners, the co-chair of the management committee defended the firm’s position 
by testifying that “life is not made up of love, it is made up of fear and greed and money 
–  how much do you get paid in large measure.”64 Right or wrong, the license afforded 
partners to look out for themselves reveals a fundamental flaw in the trust analogy, which 
operates in partnership law in only an extended sense.  
B. Corporations  
Like the partnerships of the sixteenth century, the predecessors of the modern 
corporation – the joint stock companies or overseas trading companies of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries – imported fiduciary law65 to tighten up what were seen as weak 
                     
62 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 
905-06 (1997). 
63 Donald J. Weidner, Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some United States Experience, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 1031, 1039 (2001); Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. L. 1, 1 (Nov. 1993).  
64 Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 881 
(1997). 
65 William L. Baldwin, The Corporation and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional Approach, 27 
VERMONT L. REV. 841, 842 (2003); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. 
CORP. L. 277, 307 (1998) (“The trust metaphor was first applied in the 1830s by a minority 
shareholder in an attempt to hold a director personally liable for a breach of fiduciary duty.”) 
(citing George D. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse – Judicial Power to Wind Up a 
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 220 (1940)). 
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constraints placed by contract law on the self-dealing temptations of those at the helm.66 
To this day, “fiduciarians” continue to defend that move against “contractarians,” who 
find fiduciary law a drag on the rough and tumble advantage-taking permitted by contract 
law, which, contractarians insist, can competently regulate conflicts on its own.67 Yet 
mapping fiduciary law onto corporate law is far from light work, given that the legal 
nature of corporations – what they are, who owns them, whom they should benefit – is a 
fog.68 Still, as a way of talking about corporate ownership,69 the trust analogy works well 
enough for locating shareholders in the role of beneficiary or equitable-title holder. But 
the analogy weakens when attempting to locate boards of directors and corporate 
managers in the role of trustee or legal-title holder, which they occupy in only the most 
etiolated sense.70  
1. Divided Title: Shareholders as Equitable Owners 
Until the early twentieth century, corporations were seen as aggregates of 
individual shareholders woven together by contracts. As such, corporations possessed no 
                     
66 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1459 (2002) (“The fiduciary duties of directors ... is a requirement to abstain from self-interested 
behavior.”). 
67 See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Bumping Along the Bottom: Abandoned Principles and 
Failed Fiduciary Standards in Uniform Partnership and LLC Statutes, 96 KY. L.J. 163, 173-74 & 
nn.37-39 (2007); Mark J. Lowenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In 
Defense of the “Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 411 n.1, 413-14 
(2006). 
68 Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 
120-21 & n.3 (1988); see also John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate 
Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 815-18, 835-39 (1989) (“The 
directors of a corporation owe various fiduciary duties to that corporation, and, indirectly, to the 
corporation's shareholders insofar as the corporation's affairs are concerned.”). 
69 E.g., Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong 
Question, 59 U. CINN. L. REV. 425, 425 (1990) (“In 1932 E. Merrick Dodd asked for whom are 
corporate managers trustees? Since that time the question has been asked many times, in many 
contexts, for many purposes.”). 
70 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983); Richard A. Booth, Who 
Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 150 (2001). 
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identity apart from those individuals and relations.71 Under that “aggregate” or “property” 
approach, “[d]irectors were considered agents of shareholders.”72 What is not the same, 
directors were considered corporations’ legal owners – fiduciaries73 charged solely with 
the wealth-building of their shareholders who,74 in trust terms, were considered equitable 
owners of corporate property.75 Another way of saying this is that corporations are owned 
by shareholders,76 who delegate control to a board of directors,77 who in turn set policy 
and hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, who, under board oversight, runs the company 
with the CEO’s management team.78  
Typical of trustee-beneficiary relations – predicated on separation of ownership 
and control79 – shareholders, like trust beneficiaries, act very little like owners, confident 
as they are that management will look out for them.80 Nor could shareholders act much 
like owners, given their quite-limited rights to “elect directors and, under some 
                     
71 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 261, 270 (1992). 
72 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 261, 267 (1992)(citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)(ruling that 
Ford’s corporate mission was to produce shareholder profits, not the meaningful jobs and 
affordable cars Henry Ford envisioned). 
73 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 306-07 (1998). 
74 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277-78 (1998). 
75 See, e.g., Gail Cagney, Note, Corporate Officers as Employers: Eristic Liability under ERISA, 
52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1211, 1217 n.27 (1987). 
76 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455 (1996) (“Who owns a corporation? We are accustomed to saying that 
the shareholders own it.”).  
77 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1458 (2002) (“[I]n large corporations ... actual control resides with the directors rather than with 
the shareholders.”). 
78 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 694 (1986).  
79 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 619-28 (2006).  
80 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 157 
(2001). 
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circumstances, remove them,” but in no case “tell them what to do.”81 Shareholders hold 
title to no corporate property (factories, computers, pencils),82 can initiate nothing, 
approve almost nothing, nor join large stock blocks or otherwise freely communicate or 
coordinate with other shareholders.83  
Similar enough to the interests of equitable owners of a trust res, shareholders get 
the leftovers when the company dissolves,84 can take income in the form of dividends or 
stock repurchases,85 and bring “derivative” suits against officers and directors reluctant to 
sue themselves, recovery going to the corporation, presumably to be distributed pro rata 
among stakeholders.86 Unlike trust beneficiaries, however, shareholders have official 
leverage with those at the controls by auditioning “takeover” management teams to lead 
them,87 voting on some matters,88 and selling the company out from under management, 
                     
81 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 291 (1999) (It thus may make only misleading sense to call managers/directors 
“agents” of shareholders).  
82 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 291 n.97 (1999). 
83 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 616-17 (2006); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and 
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455 (1996).  
84 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 163 
(2001); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors’ Duty To Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1993); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2002).  
85 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 165 
(2001); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors’ Duty To Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1993).  
86 Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer 
Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. 403, 420-21 (1997). The shareholder’s derivative action emerged in the mid-nineteenth 
century as an equitable device enabling shareholders to enforce rights that the corporation failed 
to assert on its own behalf. Those rights include the recovery of losses occasioned by self-dealing 
or fraudulent or grossly negligent misconduct by directors or managers. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. 
Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93 (en banc 1969). 
87 John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old 
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 815-18, 835-39 (1989). 
 18 
subject to so-called poison pills designed to run off bidders, whose ownership is diluted 
by discounts in the company’s or bidder’s stock made available to stockholders.89  
Even if managers’ control is like that of trustees (“though it was never very clear 
that trust law bore much relation to corporation law”),90 there is authority for the 
proposition that shareholders are not the equitable owner-beneficiaries.91 Specifically, by 
the late nineteenth century, corporations had taken on a vibe of entities (natural or 
artificial) with a legal (albeit fictive) personality separate from its shareholders. This 
separate personality, evidenced by limited liability, enabled such entities to sue and be 
sued, own, inherit, and dispose of property, and survive the human actors through whom 
it acts.92 This entity view reversed the legal notion that directors’ and shareholders’ 
interests align through directors’ fiduciary duties.93 Instead, on behalf of the entity, 
directors juggle the interests not just of shareholders, but “employees, managers, 
customers, consumers, and surrounding communities as well,” quite apart from their 
                                                             
88 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 616-17 (2006). 
89 For a description of various poison pills, see Heith D. Rodman, Comment, Death Toll for the 
Dead Hand?: The Survivability of the Dead Hand Provision in Corporate America, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 991, 994-96 (1999). 
90 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 150 
(2001) (citing A.A Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?: The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991)). 
91 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 
1147 & n.6 (1932) (issuance of dividends or new stock does not implicate equally corporate and 
shareholder interests); see William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business 
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 275 (1992) (“Whose interests is the board of directors 
supposed to foster or protect when substantially all of the shareholders want to sell control of the 
corporation?”). 
92 John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old 
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 810-15, 873 (1989). 
93 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 261, 276 (1992). 
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contractual claims.94 This expanded group of beneficiary-stakeholders includes 
prospective shareholders in their dealings with insiders95 and creditors when the 
corporate-debtor is insolvent or on the brink.96 And so the notion of trusteeship does 
speak to a distinct worry: how to rationalize corporate control of vast amounts of wealth 
without somehow impressing corporations with a public interest beyond management and 
perhaps even stockholders.97 “In the eyes of the law, corporate directors are a unique 
form of fiduciary who ... resemble trustees ... constrained primarily by their fiduciary 
duties, making trade-offs between the conflicting interests of different corporate 
constituencies.”98  
In sum, the shareholder-primacy view of the corporate form as expressed in the 
trust analogy, though frequently dismissed as passé99 or plain wrong,100 does somehow 
manage continually to rehabilitate itself from criticism.101  
                     
94 John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old 
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 870 (1989). See also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 270-72 (1992); Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 291 
(1999); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455 (1996). 
95 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1419 n.78 (2002). 
96 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in 
Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. OF CORP. L. 491 
(2007); see Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining 
Lawyer Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 403, 405-09, 420-21 (1997). 
97 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 167 
(2001). 
98 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 291 (1999). 
99 Richard A. Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law: From Conglomeration to Equity 
Compensation, 53 VILL. L. REV. 459, 473 (2008). 
100 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 291, 303, 327 (1999); Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 
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2. Divided Title: Directors/Managers as Legal Owners 
As putative owners of legal title to the corporate res, directors and managers, 
unlike shareholders, do act like owners, though not like trustees, despite talk to that effect 
both on a literal level102 and by way of simile.103 That managers own little compared to 
the wealth they manage, while shareholders defer to them and the directors whom 
managers install with shareholder acquiescence, makes corporations arguably 
“ownerless.”104 Directors inquire, suggest, and approve or disapprove of managers’ 
actions; but resignation is their only recourse if they disagree profoundly.105 Likewise 
does the control exerted over managers by institutional investors – pension funds, mutual 
funds, trustees, and foundations to whom individual savers entrust their funds – further 
destabilize conventional notions of ownership when applied to corporate actors.106  
Unlike trustees, directors and managers do not hold title to corporate property, 
which is in the entity’s name.107 Moreover, because shareholders may diversify, they are 
not shy about taking risks at the company level to make a big score. Managers, 
                                                             
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 169 (2001) (“Despite all the talk about how the stockholders own the 
company there is really no statutory authority for the proposition.”). 
101 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455 (1996) (alluding to “a new movement in recent years to reassert 
the rights of shareholders as owners”) (citing ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (1991)).  
102 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 1180 (1998). 
103 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
879, 880-81 (1988). 
104 Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
117, 121-22 (1988). 
105 Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
117, 140 (1988). 
106 Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
117, 135 (1988). 
107 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 291 n.97 (1999). 
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oppositely, cannot diversify: their fate follows their company’s. Thus is it managers 
(particularly CEOs) – staked more than shareholders in company performance – who 
think like owners, preferring a fair return and company survival to high-stakes 
gambling.108 To avoid shirking of duties by managers, their relations with shareholders 
are at least theoretically mediated by boards of directors.109  
While managers act like owners of the corporate res, they, like directors, fall too 
far outside the criteria of trustees in the strict sense to justify the linguistic move.110 No 
one thinks of managers as trustees, an analogy at least one expert has called “corny.”111 
Under trust law, as legal owners, trustees can have no beneficial interest in the trust res. 
Corporate law, contrariwise, permits manager ownership,112 whereby stock options and 
the funding of pension plans with stock has boosted the stakes of active manager-
investors and passive employee-investors.113  
                     
108 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 
154-55 (2001); Richard A. Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law: From Conglomeration to 
Equity Compensation, 53 VILL. L. REV. 459, 473 (2008). 
109 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 291 (1999); Richard A. Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law: From 
Conglomeration to Equity Compensation, 53 VILL. L. REV. 459, 474 (2008). 
110 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not trustees, [directors] 
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”). 
111 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 
165 (2001). 
112 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 
167 (2001). Trustees are obligated to administer trusts solely in the interest of beneficiaries. 
Similarly, agents are obligated to act solely for their principals’ benefit in all matters related to 
the agency. By contrast, corporate directors are obligated simply to treat shareholders fairly. D. 
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1483-
84 (2002). 
113 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 
150-52, 167 (2001). 
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C. Agency 
The fig leaf that all fiduciaries are trustees of sorts is removed in agency law. In a 
form that took shape in the nineteenth century114 – strongly influenced by treatise 
writers115 – agents are cast as fiduciaries, but with no homage to divided title.116 
Formally, agency “is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) 
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s 
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise 
consents so to act.”117 With such an open standard, agents abound, held out to include, to 
name a few: executors, guardians, receivers, escrow agents, banks, partners, corporate 
managers and directors, shareholders of a close corporation, doctors, securities brokers, 
real-estate brokers, and accountants.118 Though not trustees,119 agents are subject to many 
of the same rules that constrain trustees.120  
                     
114 See Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 
23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 100 (2004) (on nineteenth century agency principles). Western law 
wrestled with the problem of agency, particularly in legal representation, long before we spoke of 
“fiduciary duty,” which has by any other name percolated as a high principal of loyalty since 
Socrates. Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 555-56 (2009).  
115 Deborah DeMott, The Contours and Composition of Agency Doctrine: Perspectives from 
History and Theory on Inherent Agency Power, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1813, 1817-18 & n.12 
(2014); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 72 n.11.   
116 Kinert v. Wright, 185 P.2d 364, 368 (Cal. App. 1947). 
117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
118 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS ¶ 
82.4 (2016). But see People v. Riggins, 132 N.E.2d 928, 928 (Ill. 1956) (Schaefer, J., dissenting) 
(if “agent” encompasses “clerk, ... servant, solicitor, broker, apprentice or officer, ... each of the 
other terms is superfluous because all are embraced within the single term ‘agent’”).   
119 Estate of Djeljaj, 954 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (Bronx Surrogate’s Ct. 2012) (agents are not trustees 
“in the technical meaning of the word”). 
120 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, AM. LAW INST. 1996); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
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As for lawyers, they are “first and foremost agents,”121 whose clients are 
principals.122 “Quintessential fiduciaries,”123 lawyers are bound both by a professional 
code to “represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law,”124 and by tort law’s 
“fiduciary obligations of utmost propriety and consideration for the interests of the 
client.”125 Lawyers are not, however, “trustee of any claim or asset owned or sought by 
[the] client.”126 
There is both a procedural and remedial legal significance in the law’s finding 
that “liability rules”127 compensating plaintiffs in contracts and negligence actions are 
insufficient to regulate agents bent on self-dealing, competing with, or ripping off their 
principals.128 Procedurally, fiduciary law sides with plaintiffs by 1) blocking defenses of 
contributory or comparative fault, 2) prolonging statutes of limitations, and 3) burden-
shifting on the issue of breach.129 Remedially, the Restatement (Third) of Agency 
                     
121 Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 637 (2014). 
122 Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. 
Brunswick Ass’n. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 396 (1993)). 
123 Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics 
2000’s Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1191. Lawyers are more closely 
regulated than other agents. See Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 
579-80 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 2 Intro. Note 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
124 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010 ed.). 
125 Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort, and Contract: A Primer 
on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 235, 246 (1994). 
126 Birchfield v. Harrod, 640 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Okla. App. 1982). 
127 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
128 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (remedies for 
breach of fiduciary duty include and surpass compensation of victims). 
129 Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Claim does not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1155-56 (1999).  
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imposes “property rules”130 – accounting for profits, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and 
constructive trust (a coerced transfer back to the victim of property acquired by the 
breaching fiduciary) – even absent harm to the principal.131 Likewise are fiduciaries 
subject to forfeiture of commissions or fees,132 again, even when the breach earns the 
lawyer no profit, as in the divulgence of non-commercial confidences, the revelation of 
which causes the client no damage, emotional or otherwise.133 By coercing breaching 
lawyers into surrendering their fees, invariant either to their exploitive gains or clients’ 
losses, fiduciary law has the effect of punishing wrongdoers while evading the otherwise 
essential scienter requirement.134  
So in what ways, exactly, do lawyers and trustees differ? It is not so much that 
lawyers’ relations with clients are too competitive to allow for the professional 
selflessness expected of trustees, though tensions do inhere such relations.135 Instead, the 
                     
130 See generally Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 YALE L.J. 2083 
(1997).  
131 Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 
240, 245 (Tex. 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d (1) (AM. LAW INST. 
2006). 
132 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
1996). 
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmts. d & e (AM. LAW INST. 2006); Brian M. 
Serafin, Comparative Fault and Contributory Negligence as Defenses in Attorney Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty Cases, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 993, 994 n.10 (2008). For example, an attorney 
using a prior document as a template for a new one might inadvertently disclose to the new client 
and others the identity and factual background of the prior client’s matter, thus breaching 
confidences owed the prior client, but potentially causing no damage.    
134 See Andrew Kull, Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 17 n.1, 23-30 (2003). For a 
strong case against a generalized right to throw the book at breaching fiduciaries in the absence of 
harm to their principals, see Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137 
(1999).    
135 For example, in Evans v. Jeff. D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
civil-rights settlement against Idaho officials who conditioned their acceptance of the injunctive 
relief plaintiffs sought on a waiver of plaintiffs’ statutory, prevailing-party attorney’s fees. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys understandably expected plaintiffs to pursue and assign to them attorney’s 
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rub is that lawyers in no sense hold legal title for the benefit of others. Just as “[a] trust 
cannot be created unless there is trust property,”136 nor can a trust-like relation, which 
trades on the grammar of trusts.137 In contrast to trustees, or even partners and corporate 
managers for that matter, lawyers are paid for advice, much of which has a financial 
upshot, but precious little of which can count as investment management.138 Much more 
centrally do they safe-keep, not invest, client property (e.g., a settlement or damages 
award),139 as often as not to avoid extending clients credit during representation (e.g., a 
retainer).140   
Admittedly, much of fiduciary law is trained on determining when a principal is 
responsible for an agent’s dealings with third parties.141 For example, when a bill 
collector (agent) hired by a store (principal) absconds with payments collected from a 
debtor-customer on behalf of the store, that portion of the debt stolen by the agent is 
                                                             
fees coerced from defendants by the court in lieu of a contingency-fee arrangement, which 
plaintiffs could not afford. In sum, with the high court’s imprimatur, plaintiffs got the relief they 
sought while selling out their attorneys, who had no choice but to accept the raw deal, given their 
fiduciary duty to their clients, not to their own enrichment.  
For additional proof of the inherent conflicts in attorney-client relations, see Muzelak v. 
King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710, 717 (W. Va. 1988), where the West Virginia Supreme 
Court stated that punitive damages and statutory attorney’s fees both offset litigation costs that 
leave plaintiffs undercompensated when plaintiffs share an award with counsel in contingency-
fee cases.  
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
137 But cf. United States v. Tanabe, No. CR 11-0941 SBA, 2012 WL 5868968, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 19, 2012) (deputy sheriff who arrested DUI suspects in exchange for cocaine and gun from 
private investigator representing arrestees’ wives breached his fiduciary duty to county). 
138 E.g., Nesvig v. Nesvig, 676 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 2004). 
139 E.g., Pollack v. Crocker, 660 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding client’s IRS 
refund paid to and held for client by attorney subject to attorney’s lien). 
140 Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry, 979 N.E.2d 313, 315 (Ohio 2012) (defendant-lawyer 
“handled cases on an hourly fee basis and deposited the fee advances received from his clients 
into his client trust account”). 
141 Deborah DeMott, The Contours and Composition of Agency Doctrine: Perspectives from 
History and Theory on Inherent Agency Power, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1813 (2014). 
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discharged.142 But third parties cannot fairly be characterized as beneficiaries of lawyers’ 
fiduciary duties, though we can posit extraordinary facts posing such a setup departing 
from the convention whereby lawyers’ obligations run uniquely to the client.143 Under 
agency law, agents’ dealings with third parties bind their principals, but not because 
agents are co-obligated fiduciaries serving two masters, a conflict that would alarm any 
first-year student of torts.144 Just as third parties hold nothing like equitable title to a 
principal-client’s property, agents hold nothing like legal title to a principal’s property.145 
Boiled down, when it comes to third parties, an agent-lawyer is more mediator than 
trustee, more conduit than wealth manager.146  
Once anything resembling a trust res drops out as an element, it follows that 
agency, and what goes hand in hand, fiduciary duty, expand. For instance, according to 
the latest Restatement of Agency, all employees are agents, and all agents fiduciaries,147 
                     
142 This much is implied by People v. Riggins, 132 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. 1956). But cf id., 132 N.E.2d 
at 928 (Schaeffer, J., dissenting) (because bill collector is not store’s agent, his actions would not 
expose store to vicarious liability in tort suit filed by debtor). 
143 E.g., Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 895 (where attorney’s client holds power of attorney to act for an ailing 
relative, attorney’s fiduciary duty is to beneficiaries of ailing relative’s estate squandered by 
client under power of attorney with attorney’s assistance). 
144 E.g., H.H. Woodsmall, Inc. v. Steele, 141 N.E. 246 (Ind. App. 1923). 
145 Cf. Daniel Yeager, CRIMINAL LAW: HOMICIDE & EXCULPATION 377-78 (Wolters-Kluwer 
2015) (citing People v. Traster, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680 (Cal. App. 2003) (when defendant-computer 
consultant received $132,296 for Microsoft licenses, he got only possession of the money – title 
would vest in defendant only once he had performed the agreed-to purchase of the licenses, which 
he neither did nor ever intended to do).  
146 But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (references 
to “intermediaries” and “middlemen” are to brokers, not lawyers). 
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmts. c & g (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). But cf. 
Discussion of Restatement of the Law (Third), Agency, 2001 A.L.I. Proceedings 53 (“My problem 
isn't with the statement itself, it is that the Restatement goes on to say that all employees are 
agents, and therefore all employees are fiduciaries, which just seems wrong to me.”) (Statement 
of Richard E. Gutman). For a thoughtful take on employee-agents under the Restatement of 
Employment Law, see Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the 
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255 (2015).   
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the intention being to reduce the temptations of employees, who hold their employers’ 
good will and wealth over the barrel.148 By handling key functions and cash to boot,149 
employees might steal or at a minimum withhold “their best efforts to produce, innovate, 
cooperate with management, or share information.”150 No wonder, the story goes, 
employers spy on their employees.151 
From an employee perspective, however, they are the ones over the barrel:  
I can think of no relationship in which one party, the employee, places more 
reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or is more vulnerable 
to abuse by the other, than the relationship between employer and employee. 
And, ironically, the relative imbalance of economic power between employer 
and employee tends to increase rather than diminish the longer that relationship 
continues. Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the employee may 
have at the moment of hiring, diminishes rapidly thereafter. Marketplace? What 
market is there for the factory worker laid off after 25 years of labor in the same 
plant, or for the middle-aged executive fired after 25 years with the same 
firm?152 
 
Under such a view, employees resort to counter-moves like sabotage only to fend off 
their own powerlessness and exploitation.153 Nonetheless, managers of employee health 
and retirement plans serve as the only legally recognized, recurring example of the 
                     
148 Compare Laurel Valley Oil Co. v. 76 Lubricants Co., 797 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Ohio App. 
2003) (“Not all employees are fiduciaries”), with William Lynch Schaller, Disloyalty and 
Distrust: The Eroding Fiduciary Duties of Illinois Employees, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 13 (1991) 
(It is “well-established” in Illinois “that employees are fiduciaries of their employers.”). 
149 Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church 
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1407 (1981) 
(“Every employee is a fiduciary for his employer.”). 
150 Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry 
Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1879-80 (1993). 
151 See Jessica Fink, In Defense of Snooping Employers, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 551, 570-79 (2014). 
152 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 414-15 (Cal. 2003) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) 
(quoted in Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. 
REV. 763, 790-91 (1998)).   
153 Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry 
Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1879-80 (1993).  
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employer-fiduciary,154 despite some push from academics to expand.155 Realistically, 
neither side could be expected to renounce self-interest, given “the inherently 
antagonistic character of the traditional employer-employee relationship.”156 If there were 
any question about this, check out final-offer arbitration in major league baseball, where  
[t]eams risk injuring their relationship with a player by arguing that his worth is 
well below what the player thinks he is worth. A team might be forced to defend 
its proposal by “insulting a player and presenting arguments that harp on a 
player’s physical or mental defects, or demeaning his past contributions to the 
club, playing record or public appeal.”157  
 
Who is the other-regarding, supererogatory fiduciary there? At work, in markets, in 
capitalism, we are all over the barrel, though not all of us are fiduciaries.  
IV. Academic Influence on Fiduciary Law 
There is a nontrivial cost to decoupling fiduciary law from trusts or trust-like 
circumstances in which a colorable claim of divided title can be made: counting all 
relations based on imbalances of power/knowledge as fiduciary renders the criteria so 
                     
154 Crouch v. Bussen Quarries, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 947, 955-56 (E.D. Mo. 2015); In re 
Popovich, 359 B.R. 799, 801-02 (D. Colo. 2006) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a 
plan,” and thus subject to ERISA fiduciary duties, “to the extent” he or she “exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or disposition of [plan] assets….”) (quoting 29 
U.S.C.  
§ 1002(21)(A))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
155 Samuel J. Samaro, The Case for Fiduciary Duty as a Restraint on Employer Opportunism 
under Sales Commission Agreements, 8 U. PENN. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441 (2006); P. Prestin 
Weidner, Note, The Misappropriation of Trust Fund Taxes Under the Guise of Reasonable 
Cause, 57 VAND. L. REV. 287 (2004). 
156 Sarah J. Bannister, Note, Low Wages, Long Hours, Bad Working Conditions: Science and 
Engineering Graduate Students Should Be Considered Employees under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 74 GEO. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (2005). 
157 Eldon L. Ham & Jeffrey Malach, Hardball Free Agency - The Unintended Demise of Salary 
Arbitration in Major League Baseball: How the Law of Unintended Consequences Crippled the 
Salary Arbitration Remedy - and How to Fix It, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 63, 80 (2010) 
(quoting Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic 
and International Disputes, 10 AMER. REV. INT’L ARBITRATION 383, 390 (1999)). 
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open as to be empty, where anything, like classifying Hamlet as a comedy, is possible. 
Flexibility is a virtue sure enough;158 but it is also a vice:159 
I have a friend who is fond of defining ‘fiduciary’ as follows: “Fiduciary” is 
what the judge calls you before ruling against you. And I think we see a lot of 
those sort of complex connotations of the term, which could make it 
problematic as used in black-letter text.160  
 
Indeed, the term has become so extended that no longer is it a stretch to say that fiduciary 
duties emerge whenever – with or without anything resembling a trust res – one party has 
a broad grant of discretion over the other’s interests amidst a dependency relation due to 
information asymmetry.161 If all agents are fiduciaries, then who else among power-
wielders might we add to the list?  
1. Franchisors 
Consider franchises, where a successful chain like McDonald’s adds on 
entrepreneurial owners while maintaining a tight grip on its brand by “micromanag[ing] 
the conduct of its franchisees in excruciating detail, even specifying the order in which 
                     
158 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 
1290 (2011). 
159 See, e.g., J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary 
Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 11 (1987). 
160 Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Agency, 2001 A.L.I. Proceedings 53 (statement 
of Professor James Steven Rogers).  
161 E.g., Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of America, 624 F. Supp. 2d 292, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y 
2009) (“Under Pennsylvania state law a fiduciary duty will arise where by virtue of the respective 
strength and weakness of the parties, one has a power to take advantage of or exercise undue 
influence over the other”) (citation omitted); City of Hope Nat. Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 181 
P.3d 142, 150-52 (Cal. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 2 
Intro. Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000); Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: 
Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 922.  
 30 
condiments should be placed on hamburgers.”162 Despite the one-sidedness of franchise 
contracts,163 franchisors are not fiduciaries of their franchisees.164 
Yet testifying in 1970 before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 
General Counsel for the Federal Trade Commission John Buffington observed that 
“franchisors frequently speak of their relationship with their franchisees as being one of 
trust and confidence. It is truly a fiduciary relationship.”165 The next year, Boston 
attorney Harold Brown,166 relying solely on Buffington’s “informal” position,167 
published “Franchising – A Fiduciary Relationship” in the Texas Law Review, where 
Brown made what he claimed to be the first pitch for fiduciary law as a check on 
franchisor power.168 The following year a New York trial court, unable to find “any 
                     
162 See Melissa Ann Gauthier, Note, The SJC and Dunkin' Donuts: Squeezing the Filling Out of 
the Small Franchisee, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 761-72 (2007); Lois Therrien, McRisky, 
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 21, 1991, at 114. 
163 Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling Franchisor: The 
Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139, 144-45 (2010). 
164 Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980) 
(“A franchise relationship is inherently a business relationship, not a fiduciary relationship.”); 
Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 595 n.5 (Tex. 1992); 10 
BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 111:36 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 2011); Robert W. Emerson, 
Fortune Favors the Franchisor: Survey and Analysis of the Franchisee’s Decision whether To 
Hire Counsel, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 709, 711 & n.9 (2014) (“Only a small minority of courts 
has found that as a matter of law a fiduciary relationship exists between a franchisor and a 
franchisee.”). 
165 Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcomm. on Urban and 
Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 143 (1970) (statement of John V. Buffington). 
166 See Newark Motor Inn Corp. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 n.* (D.N.J. 
1979).  
167 49 TEX. L. REV. 650, 664 (1971) (“[T]he fiduciary nature of the franchise relationship was 
recently informally recognized by the Federal Trade Commission....”). 
168 Harold Brown, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 9.08 (rev. ed. 1998), quoted in 
Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc. v. N.A.S.T., 266 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828-29 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Brown made the 
fiduciary claim repeatedly. See, e.g., Harold Brown, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 
(Little Brown 1969); Harold Brown & Jerry Cohen, Franchise Equities, 63 MASS. L. REV. 109 
(1978); Harold Brown & Jerry Cohen, Franchise Misuse, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (1973); 
Harold Brown, Franchising: Fraud, Concealment and Full Disclosure, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 
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American cases that have either applied or rejected the fiduciary theory to franchises,” 
ruled anyway that out of Mobil Oil's “dominant economic position” and “control” over a 
single-station franchisee (a former Mobil gas-station worker) arose a fiduciary 
relationship.169 The court’s authority? Harold Brown’s “well-researched article.”170   
From there, Brown’s progress in expanding fiduciary law has been iffy, relying on 
over-readings that get promptly repudiated. For example, William Killion, in his ALR 
entry summarizing the franchising cases on point, cites Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. 
Harris for the proposition that franchisors are fiduciaries of their franchisees.171 
Specifically, Killion concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court found the fast-food chain 
the fiduciary of a franchisee to whom the chain had misleadingly understated the hassles 
in getting donut ingredients.172 But Mister Donut did not so hold; instead, the Arizona 
high court merely called the franchisor-franchisee relation “special,” citing Harold 
Brown.173 Two years later a federal district court, applying Arizona law, corrected 
Killion’s misreading.174 To Brown’s credit, not only do those courts that reject his 
                                                             
(1972). 
169 Mobil Oil Corp v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 637 (Queens County 1972). 
170 Mobil Oil Corp v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632-33 (Queens County 1972). 
171 William L. Killion, Existence of Fiduciary Duty between Franchisor and Franchisee, 52 
A.L.R.5TH 613 (2016). 
172 William L. Killion, Existence of Fiduciary Duty between Franchisor and Franchisee, 52 
A.L.R.5TH 613 §5 (2016) (citing Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Harris, 723 P.2d 670 (Ariz. 1986) 
(en banc). 
173 Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Harris, 723 P.2d 670, 673 (1986) (en banc). 
174 R.L.M. Dist. Co. v. W.A. Taylor, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 421, 429 (D. Ariz. 1988) (“[B]ecause 
Arizona's courts have never decided whether a franchise relationship is fiduciary, this court does 
not find a fiduciary relationship present.”). The other two cases summarized by Killion also 
turned out unreliable. Applying South Dakota law, see Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 
43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982), distinguishing Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 
1979). Applying Missouri law, see Jimmy Dan, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 643 F. Supp. 368, 
369 (W.D. Mo. 1986) distinguishing ABA Distrib., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 542 F. Supp. 1272, 
1286 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
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position first explicitly consider following his advice,175 but academic lawyers stand by 
his position even after courts have abandoned.176  
Indeed, to call the franchise relation “fiduciary” overshoots the intentionally 
incomplete contractual terms the parties have sketched out, whereby ownership resides in 
the franchisee (who operates much like an independent contractor) and control resides in 
the franchisor (who operates much like an employer). Thus throwing around the word 
“fiduciary” as a way of characterizing franchisors’ obligations to franchisees completely 
gives up on assessing the complexity of the relation, its long-term nature, the give and 
take, and mostly, the reality that in the commercial world, we are all subject to others, 
none of us wholly subservient nor powerful, a reality that “fiduciary” as label obscures.177 
2. Insurers 
If attempts to insinuate tendentious academic positions into fiduciary law were 
unusual, I would not be pointing to them here. But they’re not. In 1974, two Boalt Hall 
students, William Goodman and Thomas Seaton, published in their home law review a 
foreword reviewing four cases then pending in the state high court where they had 
interned.178 One of the four, Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., reinstated a jury’s 
                     
175 E.g., Phillips v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 792 F.2d 521, 523-54 (5th Cir. 1986); Murphy v. White 
Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 355 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1982); General Business Machines v. National 
Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 n.4 (D. Utah 1987); Dunkin’ Donuts 
Inc. v. N.A.S.T., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828-29 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Fashion Boutique of Short 
Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 1992 WL 170559, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.).    
176 Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New 
Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 958-59 (1993); cf. Anne L. Austin, When Does a 
Franchisor Become a Fiduciary?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1151 (1993) (some franchisors are 
fiduciaries, others not). 
177 See Gillian Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990) (quoted in IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL, 
CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS (3rd ed. 2001).  
178 William M. Goodman & Thomas Greenfield Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal 
Workings and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309 (1974). 
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compensatory damages in favor of a plaintiff whose insurer refused to pay losses from a 
foot injury incurred when he fell into a working washing machine.179 According to 
California’s high court, because the insurer’s unjustifiable attempt to avoid the policy 
breached “its duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every policy,” the $75,000 
compensatory award would stand.180 But the trial court had vacated the jury’s $500,000 
punitive-damages award due to insufficient proof of scienter, an element of just 
punishment.181 Goodman and Seaton lobbied the high court to reinstate the punitive 
damages award: 
It was in failing to meet its fiduciary obligations that the insurer in Silberg 
exposed itself to compensatory and even punitive damages. The company was 
aware of Silberg’s predicament; its behavior during his financial, physical, and 
mental collapse can only be described as grossly insensitive, displaying a lack of 
humanity that should have insulted not only the plaintiff and jurors but 
California Life’s competitors as well. Its actions were the direct result of its 
misconception of its proper loyalties. The Silberg opinion, hopefully, will leave 
insurers with no doubt that with great power goes great responsibility.182 
 
Just what the word “fiduciary” was meant here to add to an insurer’s good-faith 
obligations the authors did not elaborate. When the trial court’s ruling vacating the 
punitive-damages award was affirmed, nowhere in Justice Mosk’s twelve-page opinion 
for the court did the word “fiduciary” appear.   
 The efforts of Goodman and Seaton to expand fiduciarian values were not in vain, 
however. Five years later, in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company,183 the 
California Supreme Court again affirmed a compensatory award while reversing a 
                     
179 11 Cal. 3d 452 (1974). 
180 Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109-10 (Cal. 1974). 
181 Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Cal. 1974). 
182 William M. Goodman & Thom Greenfield Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal 
Workings and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REV. 309, 347 
(1974). 
183 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1979). 
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punitive award. This time, plaintiff’s suit against his insurer was for failure to investigate 
his claim over four back injuries suffered over seven years.184 Justice Mosk, again writing 
for the court, favorably quoted the recently published foreword of Goodman and Seaton: 
[A]s a supplier of a public service rather than a manufactured product, the 
obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage. 
The obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency 
and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold 
themselves out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust must go private 
responsibility consonant with that trust.185  
 
From this dictum on a principle of insurance contracts began a series of judicial faux pas. 
Specifically, while admitting that Egan did not exactly rule on the matter, yet finding 
“little room for doubt” that insurers are fiduciaries of their insureds, one court of appeal 
was content “assuming” as much.186 Soon after, another, while finding “no support in 
case law, other than dicta in a few Supreme Court cases,” found insurers “akin to” but not 
quite fiduciaries, leaving room for insurers’ pursuit of self-interest.187  
Six weeks later, Judge Keep, sitting in diversity, summarized California law on 
the “difficult question” of whether insurers are fiduciaries.188 Delineating the difference 
between the thing itself (a fiduciary relation) and the “seeming trend” toward something 
similar (“fiduciary-like responsibilities”),189 she concluded that an “insurer is not required 
                     
184 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979). 
185 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979) (quoting William M. 
Goodman & Thom Greenfield Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and 
Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REV. 309, 346-47 (1974). 
186 Gibson v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 208 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513-15 (Cal. App. 1984). 
187 Henry v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 586-87 (Cal. App. 1990). 
188 Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 790 (S.D. Cal. 
1990). 
189 Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 790-92 (S.D. Cal. 
1990). 
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to put the insured’s interest before its own.”190 In dismissing plaintiff’s fiduciary claim 
against defendant-insurer, Keep summed up that Egan, in stating that “the obligations of 
good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the 
responsibilities of a fiduciary,” was not saying that an insurer is a fiduciary; rather, Egan 
said only that an insurer “must exhibit those characteristics of humanity and decency 
which are similar to what is required of a fiduciary.”191 To Judge Keep, if the Egan court 
or its successors “had meant to say that an insurer is a fiduciary, they would have said 
so.”192 A relation may therefore be special or akin to fiduciary without at once being 
fiduciary.193  
Undeterred, commentators excusably thereafter continued to cite Egan for the 
idea that insurers are fiduciaries of their insureds.194 Litigants not only did the same,195 
but what is worse, continued on196 even after the California Supreme Court explicitly 
sided with Judge Keep.197 This, decades after the notion of insurer as fiduciary was just a 
gleam in the eyes of a pair of Berkeley law students.  
3. Professors 
                     
190 Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 792 & n.1 (S.D. 
Cal. 1990). 
191 Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D. Cal. 
1990). 
192 Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D. Cal. 
1990). 
193 Lennane v. American Zurich Ins. Co., 2014 WL 546061 at *4 (E.D. Cal.). 
194 See, e.g., Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 21, 23 & n.11 (1992); Jennifer A. Emmaneel, Note, Hiding Behind Policy: Confusing 
Compensation with Indemnification, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 637, 639-40 (2000).  
195 See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief, Alliance Mort. Co. v. Rothwell, 886 P.2d 606 (1994), 
No. A077559, 1997 WL 33820170 at *21-24 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.). 
196 See, e.g., Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 735 (Cal. App. 2002). 
197 Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 487, 491-92 (Cal. 2001). 
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In 1976, the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted a “trend ... toward 
liberalizing” the scope of fiduciary duties.198 As support for this trend, the court cited a 
1937 case from the Maine Supreme Court199 in which the word “fiduciary” is absent, plus 
an entry from a 1925 legal encyclopedia.200 In suits brought by disgruntled students 
against their professors for breach of of fiduciary duty, liberalizing the tort had to await 
the New Hampshire high court’s 1999 decision, Tracy Schneider v. Plymouth State 
College.201 Trends must start somewhere; New Hampshire’s expansion of professorial 
obligations started in the academic literature. 
Schneider ruled that “in the context of sexual harassment by faculty members, the 
relation of a post-secondary institution and its students is a fiduciary one.”202 The court’s 
proffered authority for the proposition? – Ronna Greff Schneider’s 1987 “Sexual 
Harassment and Higher Education,” published in the Texas Law Review.203 There, after 
positing that “[t]he faculty-student relationship is best characterized as one of fiduciary 
and beneficiary,” Professor Schneider cited professor of education and literature Billie 
Dziech, and university administrator Linda Weiner, both at University of Cincinnati 
where Schneider teaches law.204 While Dziech and Weiner’s The Lecherous Professor 
                     
198 Cornwell v. Cornwell, 356 A.2d 683, 686 (N.H. 1976) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 44, comment a, at 114 (1959). 
199 Austin v. Austin, 135 Maine 115 (1937). 
200 35 A.L.R. 280, 308 (1925). 
201 744 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1999).  
202 Tracy Schneider v. Plymouth State College, 744 A.2d 101, 105 (N.H. 1999).  
203 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 552 & n.161 (1987). 
204 Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 552 
& n.161 (1987). 
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alludes to a “student’s natural trust of teachers,”205 the co-authors nowhere attribute legal 
significance to that trust. Others have, however. Relying on Professor Schneider’s quoted 
utterance above, Professor Carrie Baker’s “Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro 
Quo Sexual Harassment” argued two decades ago that states should criminalize sexual 
harassment just like the one state that has,206 Delaware.207 
The origins of an academic push to liberalize the law go back further. 
“Historically,” noted BYU law professors Brett Scharffs and John Welch in 2005, “the 
association of teachers and their students has been viewed as a fiduciary relationship.”208 
The authority for the proposition? – a 1957 article by Harvard law professor Warren 
Seavey published in his home journal, where he stated: “Since schools exist primarily for 
the education of their students, it is obvious that professors and administrators act in a 
fiduciary capacity with reference to the students.”209 Because Professor Seavey declared 
his assertion obvious, no supporting authority was forthcoming. After Seavey lobbed that 
grenade over the wall, academic attempts to project fiduciary principles on to student-
faculty relations have continued,210 whether viewed as “sporadic”211 or “new,”212 often 
relying on Seavey and other academics.213  
                     
205 Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 552 
& n.161 (1987) (quoting BILLIE DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR 93 
(Urbana: 1984)). 
206 Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW 
& INEQ. 213, 242 & n.203 (1994).    
207 11 Del. Code Ann. § 763 (1989) (unclassified misdemeanor).  
208 Brett Scharffs & John Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the 
Fiduciary Duty of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 163 & n.24. 
209 Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: “Due Process”, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1408 n.3 
(1957). 
210 See, e.g., Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students – A Fiduciary 
Theory, 54 KY. L.J. 643, 671 (1966); Paul G. Haskell, The University as Trustee, 17 GA. L. REV. 
1, 5 & n.14 (1982) (“The teaching function … may be defined as a fiduciary function that 
imposes duties upon the university similar to those of a true trustee.”); Gerald A. Fowler, The 
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While litigated outcomes within this niche have largely resisted the expansion of 
fiduciary duties,214 professors as students’ fiduciaries does make some sense when the 
dispute is over something resembling a trust res, such as ownership of intellectual 
property produced within a senior-junior, Platonic relation in a university lab.215 Those 
cases reveal that doctrinally it is the combination of the personal (that is, whole-person) 
and commercial (that is, discrete) that characterizes fiduciary law.216 Fiduciaries thus 
stand in a sort of “Platonic plus” relation to servient parties: the Platonic part referring to 
                                                             
Legal Relationship Between the American College Student and the College: An Historical 
Perspective and the Renewal of a Proposal, 13 J. L. & EDUC. 401, 414-16 (1984); Salar 
Ghahramani, Professors as Corporate Fiduciaries: Implications for Law, Organizational Ethics, 
Public Policy, 10 VIRG. L. & BUS. REV. 237, 250 (2016) (“The fiduciary nature of the professor-
student … relationship has been recognized in certain cases….”); Nancy M. Maurer & Robert F. 
Seibel, Addressing Problems of Power and Supervision in Field Placements, 17 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 145, 153 (2010) (teachers are fiduciaries of students).  
211 See Robert P. Faulkner, Judicial Deference to University Decisions Not to Grant Degrees, 
Certificates, and Credit – the Fiduciary Alternative, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1989) 
(“[S]poradic scholarly attempts have been made calling for fiduciary principles in collegiate 
law.”). 
212 Barbara A. Lee, Student-Faculty Academic Conflicts: Emerging Legal Theories and Judicial 
Review. 83 MISS. L.J. 837, 839 (2014) (“Application of the fiduciary duty theory is relatively new 
to higher education.”). 
213 E.g., Gregg L. Katz, Note, Conflicting Fiduciary Duties within Collegiate Athletic 
Conferences: A Prescription for Leniency, 47 B.C. L. REV. 345, 365-66, 372 (2006) (citing 
Professors Goldman and Seavey for the proposition that professors are fiduciaries).  
214 See, e.g., Valente v. Univ. of Dayton, 2011 WL 3156309 *5 (6th Cir.); Zumbrun v. Univ. of 
Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506-07 (Cal. App. 1972). 
215 See Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Given the disparity 
of their experience and roles, and [Professor] Roizman’s responsibility to make patenting 
decisions regarding Chou’s inventions, Chou has adequately pleaded the existence of 
circumstances that place on [Professor] Roizman a fiduciary duty with respect to her 
inventions.”); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97-98 (D. Conn. 2000) (“Given the 
collaborative nature of the relationship between a graduate student and a dissertation advisor who 
necessarily shares the same academic interests, the Court can envision a situation in which a 
graduate school, knowing the nature of this relationship, may assume a fiduciary duty to the 
student.”). 
216 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1867 (2010) (“[B]ecause trust law developed in the context of gratuitous trusts, it does not 
necessarily govern commercial-trust arrangements. And commercial law generally addresses 
arm’s length, not fiduciary, transactions.”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 
801 (1983) (“[F]iduciary relations combine the bargaining freedom inherent in contract relations 
with a limited form of the power and dependence of status relations.”). 
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power and information asymmetries, the plus part referring to the trust res and arm’s-
length commercial exchange. To be sure, the co-production of valuable ideas might well 
occur within a nurturing Platonic relation conducted solely for the servient party’s 
betterment; yet so too might it occur within a mutually exploitive relation, where the 
servient party trades immediate property interests for career advances made possible only 
by sitting at the elbow of a great teacher.  
While student-professor skirmishes over intellectual-property rights reflect a 
tension between fiduciarian and contractarian values,217 students also have attempted to 
stretch fiduciary law when denied passing grades,218 athletic eligibility,219 special 
accommodations,220 degrees,221 or professional opportunities.222 Those attempts to 
expand fiduciary law by suing faculty, administrators, or the schools themselves223 may 
be desperate responses to the inefficacy of suits for breach of contract224 and “educational 
malpractice.”225 Yet rather than somehow cast tuition dollars as a sort of trust res, those 
cases appeal to level playing fields as an offset against strong-party opportunism.   
                     
217 For a thoughtful perspective on this tension between lawful and unlawful exploitation, see 
Carmenelisa Perez-Kudzma, Fiduciary Duties in Student's Work Product, 48 IDEA 491 (2008). 
218 André v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 1996). 
219 Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 578 S.E.2d 711 (S.C. 2003).   
220 Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
221 Manning v. Temple Univ., 157 Fed. Appx. 509, 513 (3d Cir. 2005); Ho v. Univ. of Texas 
(Arlington), 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga Univ., 618 P.2d 
106, 108 (Wash. App. 1980). 
222 Moy v. Adelphi Inst., 866 F. Supp. 696, 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Demas v. Levitsky, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 402, 408 (App. Div. 2002).  
223 On who if anyone owns a law school – the public, students, faculty, administrators, or lay 
boards of trustees – see Lloyd Cohen, Comments on the Legal Education Cartel, 17 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 25, 29-45 (2008).  
224 E.g., Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
225 E.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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And from there is it not far to where fiduciary “relations are social, domestic, or 
merely personal,” entailing no property or “financial duty” whatsoever.226 Professor D. 
Gordon Smith, pointing out the “pitfalls” that reliance on property poses for fiduciary 
law, proposes to sub in for a trust res any “critical resource” subject to the servient 
party’s control.227 Smith is particularly keen on including as critical resources a client’s 
noncommercial confidences, a conventional item of non-property.228 For Smith, “critical 
resources,” unlike any realistic notion of property, include one’s body as entitled to a 
fiduciary’s protection.229  
And it takes such a repudiation of a trust res element to explain Schneider, where 
the plaintiff’s body was subject to her fiduciary-professor’s unwelcomed touchings.230 
With Schneider on the books, other commentators felt free to declare it hornbook.231 A 
                     
226 John E. Rumel, Back to the Future: The In Loco Parentis Doctrine and Its Impact on Whether 
K-12 Schools and Teachers Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Students, 46 IND. L. REV. 711, 719-20 
(2013) (quoting In re Estate of Karmey, 2002 WL 207572, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App.) (per curiam), 
rev’d on other grounds, 658 N.W.2d 796 (Mich. 2003). But cf. Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus 
University: The University’s Implied Obligations of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 
MARYLAND L. REV. 183, 202 (2000) (Despite “an increasing tendency for courts to create 
fiduciary duties in moral, social, domestic, or in purely personal relationships where one party 
needs additional protection, students are out of luck.”). 
227 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1485-86 (2002). 
228 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1404, 1442-47 (2002). 
229 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1463-64 (2002). 
230 Awarding plaintiff $150,000 on claims for violating Title IX and breach of fiduciary duty 
against her college, a jury found that the college failed to investigate her complaints that her male 
professor had inflicted on her “a pattern of sexual harassment and intimidation.” This included 
“taking off her shirt, and placing her hand on his genitalia” and, after she rebuffed him, yelling at, 
threatening, and ridiculing her in front of other faculty, and lowering her grade. Tracy Schneider 
v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 103-04 (N.H. 1999). 
231 Kent Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Faculty and 
Administrators, 29 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY LAW 153, 159 (2002) (“One situation 
in which courts will not hesitate to find fiduciary relationships between universities and students 
is in sexual harassment claims.”). 
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decade later, a federal district court, applying New Hampshire law, noted that Schneider 
made fiduciaries of professors only in cases of sexual harassment,232 which happens to be 
an actionable tort without the need for any fiduciary-law tinkerings.233  
V. Expanding the Law: High Art or Axe-Grinding? 
With social, domestic, or purely personal relations implicating “critical 
resources,” parents, too, are held out as fiduciaries, not just when parents divert their 
child’s earnings to themselves,234 but in cases of child abuse as well.235 The same is said 
of married couples, not just in the disposition of marital property, but also where one 
aggresses against the other’s “critical resources.” In this vein is it unsurprising that 
clergy-abuse cases are characterized as breaches of fiduciary duties to protect the 
physical integrity, not just property, of servient parties.236  
This path of the law strikes me as eccentric. Suppose, for example, an attorney 
(the “quintessential fiduciary”) impulsively settles a quarrel with a client by punching 
him in the face. Should the client bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty? Can 
“fiduciary” really be so cut off from its grammar, so beyond “Beyond Metaphor”237 and 
into an idiomatic usage that trades on the criteria of fiduciary (selflessness, anti-
opportunism, protection of the weak) while at once denying those criteria (a trust res to 
conserve or grow)?  
                     
232 Franchi v. New Hampton Sch., 656 F. Supp. 2d 252, 261-65 (D.N.H. 2009). 
233 E.g., Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2004); Wilson v. Muckala, 303 
F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2002). 
234 See Jillian Benbow, Under My Roof: Parents’ Rights to Children’s Earnings, 16 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 71, 71 (2005). 
235 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VIRG. L. REV. 2401, 2473 
(1995).    
236 E.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 n.2 (Fla. 2002). 
237 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
879 (1988). 
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“Fiduciary” in this idiomatic sense is a movement in academic literature, where 
the term now is deployed as a way of getting across an ideal – that opportunism is bad, 
that other-regarding behavior is good.238 Indeed, some scholars seem to mean nothing at 
all by it, one even using “fiduciary” in the title and then again for the first time in the 
conclusion of a fifty-three page tract.239  
These fiduciary-isms, these bendings over backwards to expand the law, have 
succeeded to a point in that some have prevailed in court rulings rendered by judges who 
are open to academic commentary. This is no mean feat, given that scholarship about 
scholarship, of which there is much,240 agrees that judges cite professors infrequently.241 
Even when they do, the cites count for little,242 only really mattering about 18% of the 
time.243 With the exception of “a few transformative scholarly works” (e.g., Kathleen 
                     
238 See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, Educational Justice and the Recognition of Marriage, 2011 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 263, 263 (teachers are “morally fiduciaries” but should not “be held legally liable 
for violations” of their duties). 
239 Robert P. Schuwerk, Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students, 
45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753 (2004). 
240 “In 1998, the Mercer Law Review published a bibliography of books, articles, and colloquia 
that deal with legal scholarship; the bibliography ran to nearly thirty printed pages.” David R. 
Dow, The Relevance of Legal Scholarship: Reflections on Judge Kozinski’s Musings, 37 HOUS. 
L. REV. 329, 330 (2000) (citing Mary Beth Beazley & Linda H. Edwards, The Process and the 
Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship, 49 MERCER L. REV. 741 
(1998). 
241 E.g., ROBERT J. SPITZER, SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM LAWYERS: HOW LEGAL 
TRAINING AND LAW REVIEWS DISTORT CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 181 (2008); Joshua D. 
Baker, Student Work: Relics or Relevant?: The Value of the Modern Law Review, 111 W. VA. L. 
REV. 919, 928 (2009). But see David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal 
Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345 
(2011); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on 
Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 105, 117 (2004). 
242 Benjamin H. Barton, Saving Law Reviews from Political Scientists: A Defense of Lawyers, 
Law Professors, and Law Reviews, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 189, 205-06 (2009-2010); James W. 
Harper, Why Student-Run Law Reviews?, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1261, 1278 (1998). 
243 Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled State of 
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 70-73 (2015).  
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Sullivan’s “Unconstitutional Conditions,”244 Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right to 
Privacy,”245 Charles Reich’s “The New Property”246), professors, to their 
disappointment,247 write mainly for each other.248 Heavy hitters like Catherine 
MacKinnon, Laurence Tribe, and Anthony Amsterdam (among others)249 are 
consequently seen as outliers: unrepresentative of the group.250  
The reasons for the irrelevance of scholarly efforts are familiar.251 Prominent 
among content-related reasons is the contempt with which high-falutin’ academic lawyers 
hold doctrine, including precedent, which they get paid to transcend.252 It’s hard to put a 
positive spin on the fact that only seven percent of judges regularly read law reviews.253 
But spin we do. Law professors “influence how judges decide cases,”254 even when un-
cited,255 if only by informing “the processes, individuals, and institutions that create the 
                     
244 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). 
245 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
246 Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
247 David R. Dow, The Relevance of Legal Scholarship: Reflections on Judge Kozinski’s Musings, 
37 HOUS. L. REV. 329, 329-330 (2000). 
248 Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled State of 
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 54-55 (2015). 
249 Wayne LaFave has been cited some 180 times by the high court. 
250 Michael Vitiello, Liberal Bias in the Legal Academy: Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS. 
L.J. 507, 560-61 (2007). 
251 Dolores K. Sloviter, In Praise of Law Reviews, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 7, 8-10 & n.8 (2002); see 
Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 
51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal 
Education and The Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).  
252 See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 42 (2001); Amanda Frost, In Defense 
of Scholars’ Briefs, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 135, 138 (2013) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ 
Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 223, 229-30, 256 (2012)). 
253 Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (2002). 
254 Richard A. Wise et al., Do Law Reviews Need Reform? A Survey of Law Professors, Student 
Editors, Attorneys, and Judges, 59 LOY. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013); see Deborah L. Rhode, Legal 
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2002). 
255 Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly 
Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871, 877-78 (1996). 
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public policies that judges and lawyers eventually encounter in the cases that come before 
them.”256 From this perspective, professors’ “subtle influences”257 have an ethereal 
quality by which scholarship “provides a contextual social background for legal disputes, 
helps to make judges aware of the underlying reasons for the decisions that they make 
and offers useful suggestions for reform.”258 Because “a law review's treatment of an 
issue ... often provides the jump spark that allows the judge to get underway in the 
intellectual effort of shaping the opinion,”259 it has been said that “no principled approach 
to decision-making can ignore the contribution of academics.”260  
Be that as it may, most judges can’t be bothered.261 In a recent reboot of his 
controversial 1992 critique of law reviews,262 Judge Harry Edwards cites Supreme Court 
justices as among those on the bench who locate journal writing somewhere from “not 
particularly helpful” (Roberts) to out of touch (Scalia) to “outer space” (Breyer).263 
                     
256 Toni M. Massaro, Dean’s Welcome, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008). 
257 Michael Vitiello, Liberal Bias in the Legal Academy: Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS. 
L.J. 507, 523 (2007), citing John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political 
Contributions by Elite Law School Faculties, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1196-97 (2005). 
258 Michel Bastarache, The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial Decisionmaking, 37 
ALBERTA L. REV. 739, 746 (1999). 
259 Kenneth F. Ripple, The Role of the Law Review in the Tradition of Judicial Scholarship, 57 
N.Y.U. ANNUAL SURV. AM. L. 429, 437 (2000). 
260 Michel Bastarache, The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial Decisionmaking, 37 
ALBERTA L. REV. 739, 746 (1999). 
261 David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts 
of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1346-45 & nn.2-6 (2011). 
262 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and The Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
263 Harry T. Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell's “Goodbye to Law Reviews,” 100 VIRG. 
L. REV. 1483, 1488-49 (2014). 
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The Ninth Circuit’s Alex Kozinski is an exception.264 Some of the academic 
influence he detects is dilute, as in the lasting impression casebooks make on anyone with 
a J.D.265 Other influence is stronger, as where the writings of stubborn academics, like 
dissenting opinions, keep “the flame alive” of disfavored positions,266 or introduce “an 
entirely new legal idea or line of argument.”267  
To illustrate, Kozinski recounts the “remarkable” doings of Professor Paul 
Cassell, whose mid-90’s writings were at war with 60’s icon Miranda v. Arizona.268 In 
1997, Cassell filed an amicus brief in the Fourth Circuit reviving a stillborn federal 
statute, the unconstitutionality of which had been justifiably taken for granted since its 
1968 enactment.269 Exploiting what he saw as a loophole in Miranda’s celebrated 
“prophylactic rule” regulating police interrogation, Cassell induced the Fourth Circuit to 
deem defendant Charles Dickerson’s un-Mirandized confession admissible.270 Although 
Cassell’s run in the high court ended just after Kozinski’s article was published,271 
                     
264 Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295 (2000). 
So is Judge Posner, when he is not running them down. Compare Richard A. Posner, The Future 
of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1995), with Richard A. Posner, 
The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: (1962-1987), 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 777 
(1987) and Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 
1117-19 (1981).  
265 Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 298-302 
(2000). 
266 Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 305 
(2000). 
267 Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 307 
(2000). 
268 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
269 United States v. Dickerson, 1997 WL 33484776, No. 97-4750 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3501). 
270 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). 
271 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Without use of Dickerson’s confession at his 
trial for, inter alia, robbing a Virginia bank of $876, he was convicted anyway and sentenced to 
125 months in prison. United States v. Dickerson, 27 Fed.Appx. 236 (4th Cir. 2001).  
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Kozinski, anticipating that possibility, nonetheless fancied Cassell’s efforts a 
“monumental academic achievement.”272 
But why? Wasn’t Cassell doing exactly what Judge Merritt thought my antitrust 
professor was doing – just putting stuff out there (at best), stooping to axe-grinding (at 
worst)? There was a reason, after all, that no federal prosecutor had ever invoked the 
statute to admit a confession. Yet to Judge Kozinski, Cassell’s activity instantiates high 
professorial art. I wonder what he would say about a recent article positing the 
unconstitutionality of the NSA’s meta-data program because the program relies on Katz 
v. United States,273 a 1967 ruling which, by coming to rely on a concurring opinion, is, 
get this: no authority at all.274 So can all attempts to dispose of 50 years of precedent 
count as high art like Brown v. Board of Education,275 which overthrew a case finally 
seen as “wrong the day it was decided”?276 How about an article contorting concepts of 
mens rea and causation in order to call suicidal reactions to cyberbullying “homicide”?277 
Or a student comment petitioning to criminalize whistling at women in public?278 As 
entertaining as these exercises may be, are they, like Cassell’s once were, the beginnings 
of “monumental academic achievement?” Possibly. Or they could be the sort of 
                     
272 Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 311 
(2000). 
273 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
274 Randy Barnett, Why the NSA Data Seizures Are Unconstitutional, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 3, 12-14 (2015). 
275 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). 
276 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (Joint 
Op. of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896)). 
277 Audrey Rogers, Death by Bullying: A Comparative Culpability Proposal, 35 PACE L. REV. 
343 (2014). 
278 Amanda Roenius, Comment, My Name Is Not “Beautiful,” and No, I Do Not Want to Smile: 
Paving the Path for Street Harassment Legislation in Illinois, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 831 (2016).  
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indulgences that led Justice Scalia at an oral argument to accuse counsel of “bucking for 
a ... place on some law school faculty” by looking to overrule the Slaughter-House 
Cases,279 “contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence.”280    
Recall the strides made by Professor Schneider imposing fiduciary law on 
professors, Harold Brown on franchisors, and student-authors William Goodman and 
Thomas Seaton on insurers. Thanks to them and other like-minded scholars, fiduciary law 
really is anything goes – in court too – its grammar now not only cut off from the law of 
trusts (or trust-like relations), but quite recently having devolved into an altogether non-
technical term of art. This explains the scholarly output on fiduciary voting,281 judging,282 
governance,283 politics,284 juries,285 and friendship,286 not to mention fiduciary 
administrative,287 criminal,288 equal protection,289 and health290 law. I could go on.291 
                     
279 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
280 Transcript of Oral Argument, McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1521.pdf. (cited in 
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VI. Conclusion 
It would be misleading to say that professors write only for each other within the 
world of fiduciary law. There they have made and continue to make their mark, for better 
or worse. And what should they be doing if not “the business of creating a new stock of 
legal ideas”?292 Professors must “have better things to do with their time than to provide 
free research for judges,”293 whose law clerks should be the ones knocking out the 
wooden 50-state surveys and other documents of practicality.  
Yet so too is there a responsibility, a need to acknowledge that Hamlet is not a 
comedy, even if you can convince someone that it is. Certainly our language provides 
conventions for speaking strangely or in extraordinary ways: speaking, for instance, 
metaphorically, cryptically, loosely, personally.294 Language changes; meanings “will of 
course, stretch and shrink, and they will be stretched and shrunk.”295 That language 
inevitably changes is no reason to change it just for the sake of change. Language is 
natural, and so its changing is natural,296 not homemade or arbitrary.297 Legal language 
can accordingly get pushed and pulled,298 and like all exertions, at times too far or in the 
wrong direction to where, as J.L. Austin cautioned in the opening epigraph above, “there 
would clearly be no future in it.”  
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Knowing when, exactly, that sort of excess is staked is a knack.  
